It has always been hard for orthodox [International Relations] theorists to appreciate the international dimensions of relationships in the extra-European world, largely because they make the misguided assumption that their unitary conception of sovereignty has always defined the discipline of international politics and international law. They argue that international relations are relations between mutually independent states, because that is the only conception they possess as a way of thinking about the modern world; they lack the more flexible vocabulary of Grotius, and are thus at a loss to know how to describe, say, relations between the British paramount power and the 'semisovereign' Native States of India. What they typically do, then, is simply ignore this way of organizing international relations, perhaps giving it a breezy acknowledgement but hastily moving on to the familiar business of international politics in the European states-system. The inadequacy of their conceptual apparatus and the narrowness of their historical vision are faults of the orthodox [i.e. 'British School'] theory that continually reinforce each other.
As Keene rightly points out, much of this 'statist myopia' of both International Law and International Relations is the end product of a superficial, if not actually naïve, understanding of the complex cross-currents of early modern History, which leads directly, in turn, to a facile belief in an essentialising statist 'Presence' .
Essentialism and its juro-political correlative, the indivisibility of sovereignty, are central to the space of differance within which De Indis operates. This is clear from even the most cursory reading of Grotius' near-contemporary Jean Bodin (1529/30-1596), the progenitor of Absolutist political theory.
The entirety of Bodin's later thought is that the essentialist indivisibility of sovereignty guarantees the logical necessity of a strictly hierarchical polity.
The key element of Bodin's discursive stratagem is the fusion of Civic Humanist scholarship with a thoroughgoing Aristotelian essentialism; 'But it is clear that to have true definitions and resolution in any subject matter, one must not fix on accidents, which are innumerable, but on essential differences of form. Otherwise, one could fall Since [Jean] Bodin, indivisibility has been integral to the concept of sovereignty itself. In international political theory, this means that whenever sovereignty is used in a theoretical context to confer unity upon the state as an acting subject, all that it conveys is that this entity is an individual by virtue of its indivisibility, which is tautological indeed. What follows from this search for the locus of sovereignty in international political theory, however necessary to its empirical testability, is thus nothing more than a logical sideshow; the essential step towards unity is already taken whenever sovereignty figures in the definition of political order. Whether thought to be upheld by an individual or a collective, or embodied in the state as a whole, sovereignty entails self-presence and self-sufficiency; that which is sovereign is immediately given to itself, conscious of itself, and thus acting for itself. That is, as it figures in international political theory, sovereignty is not an attribute of something whose existence is prior to or independent of sovereignty; rather, it is the concept of sovereignty itself which supplies this indivisibility and unity.
